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ample room is provided for discussion in the interests of enlightened public opinion and where intelligent leadership is welcomed, revolutions will never be necessary.

Professor Ellwood's book is characterized throughout by a reasoned optimism and a broad and inspiring outlook. While refusing to regard man as the puppet of circumstance, the author yet grants that every aspect of consciousness is socially conditioned. He looks for a wider extension and interdependence of human activities as the sole condition under which thought may become socialized, beyond the limits of nationality, and "a humanity of wide sympathy and good will" may be developed. When reason and good will are made to work together for the advancement of the interests of all mankind then wars will cease. The extension of such rationality and good will among peoples is the great task of every social institution, but in a special sense this responsibility devolves upon education.

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The Order of Nature. LAWRENCE J. HENDERSON. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1917. Pp. v + 234.

The scholarly scientist is sure to write a book full of facts interesting to the philosopher. This Professor Henderson has already done in his *Fitness of the Environment*. The scientist is not so sure to give his facts adequate philosophic interpretation. *The Fitness of the Environment* was marred by a most naïve teleology and this new book comes apparently to give teleology a deeper and more acceptable interpretation. But I can not believe that its author has been wholly successful in this.

About one third of the book is taken up with a history of teleological thinking as it appears with Aristotle and in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In this the author has acquitted himself well and shows a most commendable grasp of the history of philosophy. There follow studies of biology, nature, evolution, the factors on which life depends, and the problem of teleology proper. The conclusion is that "the contrast of mechanism with teleology is the very foundation of the order of nature, which must ever be regarded from two complementary points of view, as a vast assemblage of changing systems, and as an harmonious unity of changeless laws and qualities working together in the process of evolution" (p. 209).

The evidence for this conclusion seems to be: "First, the characteristics of systems (phases, components, activities, etc.) are universal conditions of all phenomena, except the infra-molecular. They do not depend upon the peculiarities of the numerous varieties of matter, and they are changeless.

"Secondly, the properties of matter are so distributed among the elements that three elements possess a unique ensemble of unique characteristics,—maxima, minima, and other singular properties. But this pattern in the properties of matter is also a universal condition of phenomena. It seems to be quite unmodified by the characteristics of systems, in that, like such characteristics, it is changeless" (pp. 209–10).

The treatment of concepts in reaching this analysis, however, seems to the reviewer to be a curiously tangled mixture of idealism and scholastic realism. We are told (p. 200) that the laws of nature are "the product of the human reason and are not conceived by science to have objective existence in nature," yet (p. 119) the "process of the evolution of our world, however manifold in its details, is at least governed and directed by the general laws of physical science." Again (p. 186), "Life must manifest itself in and through mechanism," so life is evidently an entity. Also (p. 187, quoted from the *Fitness of the Environment*) we are told "there is, in truth, not one chance in countless millions of millions that the many unique properties of carbon, hydrogen, and oxygen, and especially of their stable compounds water and carbonic acid, which chiefly make up the atmosphere of a new planet, should simultaneously occur in the three elements otherwise than through the operation of a natural law which somehow holds them together." Are these properties, then, scholastic "reals" that might be accused of mixing by chance?

I think that Professor Henderson's difficulties arise from his theory of knowledge rather than from his facts. If one starts from such a point of view as is expressed concerning analysis and synthesis in Professor Dewey's *How We Think* or the *Experimental Logic* the problems of this book largely disappear. But after all our author's concept of teleology is very attenuated, for teleology is characterized (p. 204) as "the vaguest possible term which can be imagined, from which all implication of design or purpose has been completely eliminated." Yet this attenuation accents the problem, for if a whole is compounded of independent parts, there must always be a problem of how those parts came to be arranged as they are. If there is a world, on the alternate hypothesis, and our knowledge consists in selections of significant features of it, because of their significance, we may be moved to wonder that it is so complex, but the question "why" is meaningless.

This question and its answer are alike excluded by any theory of knowledge which sees knowing as a phase of behavior, a condition of a more or less complex organism in relation to its environment. "Why," taken teleologically, has meaning only in the responses of the conscious organism where ideas, as anticipations, become motives

and determine them. It is not the universe, but only certain organisms that have a structure making such ideal anticipations possible. Man's present action may be guided by what may take place tomorrow, but the lilies of the field are innocent of such subtleties. Man is, then, teleologically disposed because, in the lawful behavior of the cosmos, he has attained a certain structure with its consequent behavior capacities, and the lilies are colored for the same reason. Yet there is a great difference between ends attained through teleological capacity and ends realized without it, even though the latter may turn out the more advantageous. It is one thing to be hungry and to satisfy that hunger from a carefully selected bill of fare, another to be born beautiful and take the consequences.

Auguste Comte once said that "to be surprised that a tree is adapted to conditions, as it is, is to be surprised that a tree exists," and this is the sort of wonder that fills Professor Henderson. Our universe is rich in such sources of wonder, and science can do little to dispel them. We may resolve complex phenomena into concatenations of more simple ones and, when we find correlations between the properties of the simpler and the more complex, we say we have the laws on which the complex depends. When we look at things closely, we may find uniformities amongst the analytic components of wholes of which they are the harmonious consequents, but that does not give us the right to assume that the components are there for the sake of the whole, but merely to predict that if the components had not been there, the whole would not have been. Without the properties of the three elements, C, H, and O, there would undoubtedly not be the sort of living organisms we know. But why is this teleology?

Some men, however, can not steel their minds against the question "why," put to the cosmos. If asked, more coherent than the anomalous teleology of our author, is the Kantians' effort to construe the world in moral terms. But the non-romantic thinker, even if Hegelian knowledge of the whole is assumed as given, realizes that he has therefore no sort of understanding, but can only stand at gaze and murmur "Lo, such is the world."

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JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

REVUE DE METAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE. March, 1917. *Les conceptions de l'histoire de la philosophie* (pp. 135-147): V. DELBOS. — An examination of the ideas underlying histories of philosophy since the *Dictionary* of Bayle as preliminary to obtaining